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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ,) 
Respondent, ( 
vs. , Case No. 
I iosn 
DAR,VIN OLSEN, ) 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Darwin Olsen, appeals from a con-
viction of the crime of burglary in the second degree 
in the First Judicial District Court, Cache County, 
State of Utah. · 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT 
The appellant was charged by information with 
the crime of burglary in the second degree. Appellant 
1 
waived jury trial and the matter was heard No b vem er 
29, 1966, by the Honorable Ferdinand Erickson, Sixth 
J udical District, sitting by invitation, and appellant 
was found guilty. Sentence was imposed J anuar y t 
1967, of confinement in the Utah State Prison for the 
intermediate term as provided by law of not less than 
one nor more than twenty years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment of the 
First Judicial District Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the follow-
ing statement of facts as being more in keeping with 
the rule that evidence will be reviewed on appeal in 
a light most favorable to the trial court's determination. 
During the night of March 3-4, 1966, the Hyrum 
Drug Store, Hyrum, Utah, was entered and a quantity 
of narcotic drugs was taken from a locked cabinet 
within the store (T. 13). There had been a light snow-
fall that night and two sets of tracks were seen leading 
from the rear of the store through an adjacent pasture 
and then northward back to the main road ( T. 116) . 
One track was narrow-toed and small heeled, akin to 
an Italian boot. The other was a round-toed shoe mark 
(T. 117). 
2 
Dennis Hunt and .Mary Jones, the two State wit-
nesses, testified that appellant and one l\Iichael Nielson 
had accompanied them on the evening of )larch 3, 
I 966, on an automobile ride from Logan, Utah, to 
Pocatello, Idaho, back to Logan, Utah, then to Hyrum, 
Utah, and finally to Ogden, Utah (T. 52, 54). 
They stopped at appellant's home and appellant 
brought out a crowbar ( T. 54). 'Vhile .Mary Jones 
was inside of the vehicle with the windows up (T. 57), 
Hunt, Nielson, and appellant were inYoh,ed in a dis-
cussion as to a possible breaking and entry somewhere 
in Hyrum (T. 56). 
Hunt parked his vehicle approximately one block 
north of the Hyrum Drug Store and appellant and 
Nielson left the vehicle carrying the crowbar and an 
empty zippered bag ( T. 58). Hunt and .Mary Jones 
then drove around Hyrum for thirty to forty minutes 
until returning to pick the two up. \Vhile so stopped, 
the Hunt vehicle was seen by an eye witness (T. 43). 
Mary Jones testified that she saw the two men go 
across the pasture toward the store and that she later 
heard a screeching noise coming from the store ( T. 
132). 
When appellant and Nielson returned to the vehicle, 
the zippered bag was full of bottles ( T. 132) . The four 
then returned to Ogden, Utah, where the bag was 
opened revealing numerous types of narcotics; labels 
were scraped off several bottles by Nielson and appel-
lant (T. 135). During this period, Nielson was wearing 
3 
pointe~ toed shoes with a small heel ( T. 136). These 
narcotics were later turned over to the Cacl1e c . , . ounty 
Sheriffs office by Hunt and identified by the 
0 wner 
of the drug store as coming from his supply by the cost 
codes on the bottles (T. 21, 22). 
ARGU~IENT 
POINT I 
STATE'S WITNESS, DENNIS HUNT, 'VAS 
NOT AN ACCOMPLICE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW; THEREFORE, HIS TESTIMONY RE-
QUIRES NO CORROBORATION. 
Appellant attempts to show that one of the State's 
witnesses, Dennis Hunt, was an accomplice to the crime 
for which appellant stands committed and, therefore, 
this testimony requires corroboration to be admitted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953). 
Respondent would say only that in no way does 
appellant's characterization of Hunt ring true. Hunt 
had no hand in the planning of the burglary of this 
specific store. He only had some notice that appellant 
and Nielson were planning a job "somewhere in Hy-
rum" (T. 56). The mere knowledge that a crime is 
about to be committed does not constitute such person 
an accomplice, no matter how reprehensible such con-
duct may be. State v. Mercer, 114 Mont. 142, 133 P.2d 
358 (1943). 
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.Th: fact that the parties were using Hunfs auto-
mobile is not sufficient in and of itself to make him 
an accomplice and the theory of Hunt being a lookout 
clefies common sense. Hunt was seen waiting over one 
block away by an eye witness (T. 43). 
Both Hunt and 1\-Iary Jones testified that they 
drove around the town of Hyrum awaiting the retur;1 
of appellant and Nielson. They returned to the meeting 
area too early then drove around for seYeral more min-
utes ( T. 131). A mobile lookout is a rather novel inno-
v3-tion when the lookout is driving several blocks from 
the scene of the crime and stopping to rest indiscrimi-
nately. 
The further fact that he did not report the crime 
to the police during or immediately after its commission 
does not make him an accomplice, but only possibly 
an accessory under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-45 (1953), 
providing: "All persons who, after full knowledge that 
a felony has been committed, conceal it from a magis-
trate, or harbor and protect the person who committed 
it, are accessories." This court had held that accessories 
are not accomplices within the meaning of U tab Code 
Ann.§ 77- 31-18 (1953), or its predecessors, requiring 
corroboration of accomplices' testimony. People v. 
Chadwick, 7 Utah 134, 25 Pac. 737 (1891); State v. 
Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 70 P.2d 458, (1937). 
There was much made of the fact that Hunt was 
apparently working for the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation as an informer. He was supposed to attempt to 
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obtain information about car theft activities of appel-
lant and Nielson ( T. 100) . The fact that he actuallv 
informed on appellant for a burglary involving narcoti;s 
would not seem to deprive him of his status of an in-
formant, as it has been held one who under the direction 
of an officer or on his own initiative feigns complicity 
in a crime in order to detect the perpetrator is not an 
accomplice, People v. Piaschik, 159 Cal. App.2d 622, 
323 P.2d 1032 (1958). 
In Hyde v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 452, 165 S.W. 195 
( 1915), a witness, who when a burglary was suggested 
seemingly consented, stood along side the building 
while it was being burglarized, and accepted part of 
lhe money stolen, which he later turned over to the 
police and identified the men who committed the bur-
glary, was held not to be an accomplice: 
There are certain relations recognized by law 
in which voluntary cooperation of a person with 
the accused does not render such person an ac-
complice. Thus, those who cooperate with a view 
to aid justice by detecting a crime ... even 
though ... he unites and apparently approves 
... [is not an accomplice.] (Holmes v. State, 70 
Tex. Crim. 214, 156 S.W. 1171 (1913).) 
This court had held "an accomplice is a person 
who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent 
with the principal offender, unites in the commission 
of a crime. The cooperation in the crime must be real, 
not merely apparent." State v. Coroles, 7 4 Utah 94, at 
98, 227 Pac. 203 (1929). 
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. The respondent would submit that under no pos-
sible theory could Hunt be considered an accomplice; 
therefore, his testimony stands. 
POINT II 
STATE'S WITNESS .MARY JONES vVAS 
NOT AN ACCOMPLICE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW; THEREFORE, HER TESTIMONY RE-
QUIRES NO CORROBORATION. 
Appellant contends that Mary Jones, the other 
State witness, was also an accomplice. Respondent 
would submit that there was not one scintilla of evi-
dence adduced at trial showing a prior knowledge by 
Mary Jones that this drug store was to be burglarized. 
It was clear from the record that Mary Jones was 
not privy to any conversation that might have taken 
place concerning the burglary. She testified that when 
she saw appellant bring a crowbar from his home, she 
"figured something was up," but did not know what 
it was ( T. 151 ) . It was not until the car had circled 
the drug store three or four times that she had an indi-
cation that a burglary attempt was imminent (T. 154). 
Mary Jones admitted that she consumed some of the 
stolen narcotics and could therefore be liable under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-12 (1953) for receiving stolen 
property, but this would not render her an accomplice 
as to the burglary whose testimony need be corroborated. 
In State v. Bowman, supra, where witness stored stolen 
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goods in his house, this court held that his testimon. 
in the trial of defendants for the burglary need n;t 
be corroborated as he was an accessory or a receiver 
of stolen property; that being a distinct crime from the 
one which the defendant was convicted. "An accomplice 
is one who is liable to prosecution for the identical 
offense charged against the defendant on trial." State 
v. Fertig, 120 Utah 224 at 227, 233 P.2d 347 (1951). 
One who could not be convicted of the crime with which 
the defendant is charged is not an accomplice no matter 
how culpable his conduct in connection therewith may 
be. State v. Cragun, 85 Utah 149, 38 P.2d 1071 ( 1934). 
1\1ary Jones lacked the essential element of being an 
accomplice, that of a common criminal intent shared 
with the principal offender. 
Mere knowledge that a crime is about to be com-
mitted does not make on an accomplice. State v. JJlercer, 
133 P.2d 358 at 351, 114 ~Iont. 142 (1943): 
A person cannot be characterized ~s a pri1:1ci-
pal simply because he is present while a ~ru~e 
is perpetrated pr~vided he takes no part .m it. 
He must render aid to the actor and share m the 
criminal intent of him who actually committed 
the offense ... 
People v. Wooten, 162 Cal. App.2d 804, 328 P.2d 
1040 ( 1958), to the same effect State v. Johnson, 57 
N.~I. 716, 263 P.2d 282 (19.53), State v. Moczygemba, 
234 Ore. 141, 379 P.2d 557 (1963). 
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In a case strikingly similar factually to the present 
case, in which the two defendants got out of the car 
in which they, the victim, and the State's witnesses 
were riding to repair the car and while so engaged, 
out of earshot of the witness and victim, dicussed 
robbing the victim, and subsequently did so, giving the 
victims' s wallet to the witnes for safekeeping, the Ari-
zona Court held that in the absence of preconsent, mere 
presence at the scene of the crime does not make one 
an accomplice and the fact that the witness received 
stolen property did not make her an accomplice to the 
homicide whose testimony need be corroborated. State 
v. Sims, 99 Ariz. 302, 409 P.2d 17 (1965). 
Respondent submits that Mary Jones was not an 
accomplice, and the fact that she may have been an 
accessory, a receiver of stolen property, or chargeable 
with some other offense does not make her an accom-
plice; therefore, her testimony need not be corroborated. 
This attitude was shared by the trial court when 
it held that l\ilary Jones was not in any way a participant 
(T. 165), notwithstanding the fact that she shared in 
its fruits. 
POINT III 
NEITHER OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES 
WERE INF ACT OR IN LA '~r ACCOMPLICES, 
AND IN ANY EVENT, THERE WAS SUFFI-
CIENT EVIDENCE ADDUCED TO CORROB-
ORATE THEIR TESTIMONY. 
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Respondent has shown that neither Dennis Hunt 
nor Mary Jones were accomplices in the crime for 
which appellant stands convicted. 
Corroborative evidence, to be sufficient need not 
go to all material facts but may be slight and entitled 
to a little consideration. State v. W oodhall, 6 Utah 2d 
8, 305 P.2d 483 (1956); State v. Virgil_. 123 Utah 495, 
260 P.2d 539 ( 1953). It must be consistent with guilt 
and inconsisent with innocence and connect the defend-
ant with the commission of the crime. Circumstantial 
evidence may constitute corroboration. State v. Park, 
44 Utah 360, 140 Pac. 768 (1914). 
The druggist and the sheriff testified that there 
were two sets of footprints leading from the back of 
the store across the field and one set had pointed toe 
and small heel marks ( T. 136) . Miss Jones and Mr. 
Hunt testified that the appellant and Mr. Nielson 
alighted from the car on the road and went across the 
field towards the drug store ( T. 132) . Mis Jones tes-
tified that Mr. Nielson had on boots with narrow toes 
and small heels on the night of the burglary and that 
he said he would have to "get rid" of them (T. 136). 
The druggist testified that a door to the drug store 
had been pried off. Miss Jones testified that she heard 
a "screeching" sound coming from the vicinity of the 
drug store. These circumstances, taken together, re-
spondent submits, constitute independent physical evi-
dence which corroborates the witness' tetimony. 
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CONCLUSION 
The facts in the instant case amply demonstrate 
that the trial court acted properly in finding appellant 
guilty of the crime charged. The legal claims of error 
on which appellant relies for reversal are wholly with-
out merit. The two State witnesses were not accomplices 
and their testimony does not, therefore, reqmre cor-
roboration. This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
LEROY S. AXLAND 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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